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v. South Jersey National Bank, 66 N.J.

161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974).
On January 24, 1972, William B. King discovered that his automobile was missing from a private parking area behind his apartment building. The Camden police informed King that his car had
not been stolen but had been repossessed by representatives of the
South Jersey National Bank,' the assignee of an installment sales contract which King had entered into when he purchased the car. 2 The
contract granted to the seller and its assignees a security interest in
the automobile to secure payment of the debt. 3 It included an acceleration clause, 4 a clause incorporating by reference all pertinent rem-5
edies available tinder the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code,
and a separate provision allowing for self-help repossession in the
event of default bv the buver. 6 When King defaulted in his pay1 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 4, King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330
A.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Plaintiff].
2 King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 166, 330 A.2d 1, 3 (1974). The sales

agreement was a form contract provided by the bank. Brief of Plaintiff, supra
note 1, at 3.
* King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 166, 330 A.2d 1, 3 (1974).
4
Id. at 166, 330 A.2d at 4. Although late payments had been accepted by the bank
previously, King's failure to make timely payments in December of 1971 and in January
of 1972 triggered the repossession of his car. Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 1, at 3-4. King's
offer to pay the defaulted payment after repossession 'was rejectpd by the bank. The
bank invoked its right to accelerate and demanded the full balance due before it would
return the car. 66 N.J. at 166, 330 A.2d at 4. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-506,
Comment, which suggests that if the agreement contains an acceleration clause which
expressly makes the full balance due on the default of one installment, then the debtor
may redeem only by tendering the entire balance.
5 King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 166, 330 A.2d 1, 3 (1974). N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:9-503 (1962) provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-504 (1962) provides in part:
A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of
the collateral ....
This is a verbatim adoption of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503-04.
6 King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 166, 330 A.2d 1, 3 (1974). For a general
discussion of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as it applies to consumer contracts see Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the
Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302 (1972).
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ments, the bank relied on these provisions and repossessed the automobile without providing King notice of the repossession or afford7
ing him a prior hearing to challenge the seizure.
Subsequent to the repossession, King brought an action in the
chancery division of the superior court, and obtained a temporary
restraint of the sale of his automobile. 8 King then filed an amended
complaint, 9 seeking a declaratory judgment that the acceleration
clause was unconscionable, and that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-503,
permitting self-help repossession, was "unconstitutional on its face
and as applied" since it authorized a deprivation of property without
notice or prior hearing. 10 The court granted the bank summary judgment, holding that section 9-503 was constitutional and rejecting the
unconscionability claim." King appealed, and while the case was
pending unheard in the appellate division, the New Jersey suprene
court granted certification.12
7 King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 166, 330 A.2d 1, 4 (1974).
8 Id. at 166, 330 A.2d at 4. The parties agreed in later negotiations, formalized by a
consent order, that the vehicle be returned to King. In return, he was to pay his account
up to date including all late charges. The consent order specifically provided that King
would be given a thirty-day grace period on his monthly payments before he would be
considered in default. Joint Appendix of Appellants and Respondent at 28a-29a, King
v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Appendix].
9 King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 166, 330 A.2d 1, 4 (1974). The only
significant change in the amended complaint was the addition of a claim that the Bank's
action constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of Article I, paragraph 7 of the
Constitution of the State of New Jersey. Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 38a. Neither
complaint alleged a violation of Article I, paragraph 1 of the constitution, which was dealt
with at length in both the majority and dissenting opinions. King v. South Jersey Nat'l
Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 177-79, 181, 191-94, 330 A.2d 1, 9-10, 11, 17-19 (1974).
10 Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 38a-39a. This was the third count of King's
amended complaint. The first count sought damages for the unlawful conversion of the
automobile. This count was dismissed by the chancery division, and the New Jersey
supreme court determined that any action for unlawful conversion of the automobile
would ultimately depend upon its decision regarding the third count of the complaint.
King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 166-67, 330 A.2d 1, 4 (1974). The second
count sought damages for the unlawful conversion of personal property inside the automobile. Id. at 167, 330 A.2d at 4. This count was later dismissed by mutual agreement.
Id. at 167 n.4, 330 A.2d at 4.
11 Id. at 167, 330 A.2d at 4. The court based its decision on Messenger v. Sandy
Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (Ch. 1972). Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at
8a. The court in Messenger held that the codification of the common law right of self-help
did not constitute state action, and, therefore, self-help was not a violation of procedural
due process under the fourteenth amendment. Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., supra at
8, 17, 295 A.2d at 405, 410. For a discussion of Messenger see Note, Uniform Commercial
Code-Self-Help Repossession Under Section 9-503 Does Not Violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 629 (1973).
12 King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 63 N.J. 561, 310 A.2d 476 (1973).
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In King v. South Jersey National Bank, 13 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the chancery division, holding
that the state was not involved in the bank's act of self-help
repossession-thus the necessary "state action" required to invoke the
procedural due process protection of the fourteenth amendment was
absent.14 The court further held that self-help did not abridge any
fundamental constitutional rights and was therefore not violative of
the New Jersey constitution.' 5 Finally, the court denied plaintiff's assertion that the acceleration clause in the contract was unconscionable. 16

The right of a secured party to repossess the collateral upon default has been described as "the secured creditor's ultimate weapon
against a defaulting debtor. "17 Although debtors have succeeded in
partially disarming the creditors' arsenal of ex parte prejudgment remedies, notably in the areas of wage garnishment' 8 and replevin, 19
challenges to self-help have met with little success. 20 The attacks
against self-help are generally based upon federal constitutional
grounds, alleging a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 21 Occasionally, however, debtors have attempted
1366 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974).
14Id. at 172, 179, 330 A.2d at 7, 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states in part: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." For a discussion of the fourteenth amendment state-action requirement see notes
23-26 infra and accompanying text.
15 66 N.J. at 178, 330 A.2d at 10.
16Id. at 169-70, 330 A.2d at 5. The court relied upon the fact that it is an accepted
commercial practice to provide for acceleration of payments in a retail installment contract, and "[iun the absence of extraordinary circumstances," it would not declare remedies secuied by a private contractual agreement unconscionable. It applied this same
reasoning in summarily dismissing any claim that the self-help clause of the contract was
unconscionable. Id.
17 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-5 (1972).
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UNDER
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UNIFORM

18 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Sniadach, the seminal case in
the creditor remedy area, " 'unleashed a barrage of due process attacks on virtually every
form of action . . . in which summary proceedings without notice and hearing were
formerly permissible.' " Del Duca, Pre-Notice, Pre-Hearing, Pre-Judgment Seizure of
Assets-Self-Help Repossession Under UCC § 9-503: Its Antecedents and Future, 79
DICKINSON

L.

REv.

211,

212

(1975)

(footnote

omitted)

(quoting from

Amram

&

Schulman, Annual Survey of Pennsylvania Legal Developments--Civil Practice and
Procedure, 45 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 167, 171 (1974)).
19 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
20For a list of federal and state court cases holding that self-help repossession is a
valid contractual remedy not involving state action see 66 N.J. at 168-69 n.6, 330 A.2d
at 5.
21See, e.g., Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784, 785 (W. Va. 1974) (repossession of mobile
home); John Deere Co. v. Catalano, 525 P.2d 1153, 1154 (Colo. 1974) (repossession of
farm equipment).
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to overturn self-help remedies by proceeding under a state constitution's due process clause. 2 2
A federal constitutional challenge to self-help turns on whether
the exercise of the creditor's remedy under attack can somehow be
attributed to the state, notwithstanding that self-help was privately
contracted for and that, upon default, repossession was accomplished
without the aid of state agents. If the state is not involved, self-help
remains a purely private act outside the purview of the fourteenth
amendment. 2 3 A problem arises, however, in cases where closer
scrutiny of ostensibly private activity reveals substantial state
involverment. 24 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
The majority of cases attacking self-help have been brought in federal courts under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). See,
e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974);
Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16, 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1006 (1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 608 (6th Cir. 1974).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) creates a civil cause of action for violation of federal civil
rights under color of state law. Courts have construed the under-color-of-law requirement
in section 1983 as the equivalent of the state action requirement under the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1006 (1974).
The debtor's inability to show state action results in a dismissal of the case for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and precludes an examination of
self-help on the merits. See Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404, 406 (8th Cir.
1974).
22 66 N.J. at 177, 330 A.2d at 9; Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784, 785, 786 (W. Va. 1974).
The due process clause of the West Virginia constitution does not, on its face, require
state action. W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 10. Nevertheless, the Cook court indicated that some
degree of state involvement was necessary to invoke the protections of that clause. Cook
v. Lilly, supra at 785, 786.
23 The Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), first emphasized
the difference between state and private action, noting that the fourteenth amendment
does not prohibit "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights," but that "the prohibitions
of the amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority." Id. at 11,
13.

24 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). In
Burton, a private corporation which operated restaurant facilities on premises it leased
from a Delaware state agency refused service to a person solely on the basis of his color.
Id. at 716. The Court held that the corporation was not acting in a purely private capacity.
The operation by the state of the remainder of the building as a parking facility and the
status of the state as lessor conferred a mutual benefit on both the state and the private
party. Id. at 724. The state had placed its power and prestige behind the discrimination
and had become "a joint participant in the challenged activity." Id. at 725. Therefore,
there was sufficient state action to bring the private discrimination within the scope of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 726.
Perhaps cognizant that its analysis might be accorded an expansive reading in later
state-action cases by parties desiring to command fourteenth amendment protection, the
Court limited its holding:
[W]hen a State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown
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formulating a precise indicator of state involvement is an unachievable task, since the state's sphere of activity may tangentially touch
upon many areas of private action. 25 Only when this involvement becomes "significant" does the private act fall within the scope of the
6

fourteenth amendment. 2
Debtors have fashioned numerous arguments to support their
contention that self-help repossession is tainted to a significant degree
by state involvement. Although these arguments often overlap, several distinct theories are discernible. The plaintiff in King advanced
what have become traditional arguments in self-help cases. 27 He first
contended that codification of self-help through adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) represented a state policy which authorized and encouraged the bank to proceed with extra-judicial
repossession. 2 8 He maintained that the ultimate source of authority
for self-help was section 9-503, not the security agreement, and that
the bank had "clothed its conduct with the authority of state law"
when it incorporated this section, by reference, into the security

agreement. 29
to have been the case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must
be complied with by the lessee ....
Id.
2 Id. at 722, 725-26.
26Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). For a general discussion of
state action see Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors'
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 1 & 2), 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003,
1034 (1973), (pt. 3), 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1973). The authors suggest the following
analytical approach to determine if state action exists:
With respect to each factual situation, the following questions should be asked
and answeted beforc a conclusion is reached concerning state action: (1) Precisely what is the nature of the challenged conduct? (2) What is the relationship,
if any, of the state to that conduct? (3) If a relationship is found, what is the
character and significance of that relationship? Is the party challenging "state
action," or is he really challenging private action and complaining that the state
has not acted affirmatively to shield him from it?
46 S. CAL. L. REV. at 1042.

27See Burke & Reber, supra note 26, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. at 4, where it is stated:
[D]ebtors attempting to establish the presence of state action in the exercise of
the various self-help remedies . . . have necessarily relied on the "public function" cases, the "state regulation" cases, the cases mentioning "authorization"
and "encouragement," and the decision in Reitman v. Mulkey [, 387 U.S. 369
(1967)].
(Footnotes omitted.) For cases in which the above challenges have been raised by
debtors see, e.g., Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 1974) (authorization and encouragement); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1110 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1039 (1974) (comprehensive state regulation and public function); James v.
Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1974) (Reitman v. Mulkey decision).
28 See Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 1, at 8-15.
29 Id. at 13-14.
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The King court rejected plaintiff's contention, reasoning that the
bank's act of self-help repossession was based solely upon the private
contractual right embodied in the security agreement. 3 0 Chief Justice
Hughes, speaking for the majority, placed great emphasis upon the
historical toleration of self-help--a right which "has roots deep in the
common law. '"31 The court held that, by enacting section 9-503, the
state did nothing more than codify this pre-existing common law
right. Mere codification, "neither commanding nor forbidding" the
private remedy provided for in the contract, did not constitute the
"affirmative and significant" action the court deemed necessary to render self-help repossession "vulnerable" to the fourteenth amendment.

32

The plaintiff in King also offered the rationale presented in Reitman v. Mulkey3a to support his contention that codification of selfhelp evidenced state action. 34 In Reitman, state action was found
30 66 N.J. at 176, 330 A.2d at 8. Although most self-help cases have been decided on
the basis of a contractual provision authorizing repossession in event of default, at least
one court has held that "the presence or absence of contractual consent by the [debtor]
to self-help action" would not modify its finding that state action was not present. Colvin
v. Avco Financial Servs. of Ogden, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 25, 27 (D. Utah 1973).
3166 N.J. at 170, 330 A.2d at 5. For an in-depth discussion of the historical antecedents of self-help repossession see McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right
to Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 58 (1973). That author concluded:
The right to repossess upon default has been available to holders of a security
interest in collateral either by statute, common law, or agreement of the parties
in the United States virtually since the beginnings of the republic.
Id. at 81.
32 66 N.J. at 175, 330 A.2d at 8. Justice Clifford, concurring with the majority, took the
court to task for placing undue emphasis upon the passive and neutral aspect of the
legislature's codification of self-help. He stated:
The legislature did something when it enacted N.J.S.A. 12A:9-503. The state
was not passive. In effect, it sanctioned and perhaps even encouraged creditors
in their use of self-help repossession. But I do not understand that act to be the
sort of affirmative conduct giving rise to state action of a constitutional grain....
...The statute in no way commands the creditor.., it simply authorizes. And
mere authorization of private conduct does not ex necessitate comprise "state
action."
Id. at 180, 330 A.2d at 11.
33387 U.S. 369 (1967).
34Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 1, at 9-10. Other debtors have relied on the Reitman
analysis to support their claims that state action exists. These arguments, however, have
been soundly rejected by the courts. See, e.g., James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208-09 (5th
Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1009 (1974).
See also Burke & Reber, supra note 26, 46 S.CAL. L. REV. at 1074, where the authors
observe:

The Supreme Court's decision in Reitman u. Mulkey was widely touted as the
harbinger of great expansion in fourteenth amendment state action doctrine. The
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when California, by popular referendum, amended its constitution to
protect the right of private individuals to discriminate in the sale of
housing.3 5 The United States Supreme Court, agreeing with the decision of the state supreme court, held that the challenged amendment
was more than a neutral enactment. 3 6 By elevating the common law
right to discriminate in the sale of real property to the level of a state
constitutional right, the amendment had the effect of encouraging
discrimination and was therefore invalid. 3 7 The King court rejected
the Reitman analogy and adopted the prevailing view that codification
of self-help does not rise to the level of authorization and encouragement condemned by the Reitnian Court. 3 8 Furthermore, the court
indicated that the Reitman rationale was to be limited to the area of
racial discrimination. 39
An additional argument advanced by King was that by virtue of
the comprehensive statutory regulations controlling procedures for
repossession, subsequent resale, and deficiency judgments, 40 "the
Court's opinion contained language which seemed to presage findings of state
action in situations which could not have been anticipated under prior decisions.
But history seems to have belied these forecasts ....
(Footnotes omitted.)
35387 U.S. at 370-71, 380-81.
" Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority, noted without criticism the California court's observation that in some instances a state could maintain a neutral statutory
policy permitting private discrimination without significantly involving itself in the
private act. Id. at 374-75.
37Id. at 381.
m 66 N.J. at 175, 330 A.2d at 8. For cases considering and rejecting the Reitman
analogy see Gibbs v. Titelnan, 502 F.2d 1107, 1111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039
(1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208-09 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank,
493 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 4i9 U.S. 1009 (1974).
39 66 N.J. at 175 & n.12, 330 A.2d at 8. Most courts have distinguished the racial discrimination cases as involving a special constitutional right and have therefore held the
state action analysis in those cases inapplicable to self-help repossession. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank,
493 F.2d 739, 744-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Adams v. Southern
Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 333 n.24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
However, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974), Justice
Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, stated that the majority's reasoning leading to a refusal to find state action in a utility termination case would seem to apply equally to
the racial discrimination area: "The Court has not adopted the notion, accepted elsewhere, that different standards should apply to state action analysis when different constihitional claims are presented." For a similar criticism of the distinction made by
some federal courts between state action requirements in racial discrimination suits and
state action requirements in self-help repossession cases see Comment, State Action and
Waiver Implications of Self-Help Repossession, 25 ME. L. REV. 27, 32-33 (1973).
40Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 1, at 15-17. The plaintiff presented the New Jersey
statutory procedure that a secured party must follow after repossession in order to transfer
the title of the repossessed vehicle and to resell the vehicle:
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State ha[d] 'so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence' "
with the bank that it had become an active and joint participant in the
repossession process. 4 1 The court acknowledged that the state had
established statutory procedures which the repossessor must follow to
transfer title or to effectuate resale of the repossessed vehicle, but
the nexus between the private nature of self-help and the subsequent
conduct regulated was deemed insufficient to warrant a finding of
state action. 4 2 Moreover, the court noted that these regulations
"would be operative, in the case of a motor vehicle, even had it been
' 43
repossessed after notice and a judicial hearing. "
As a final state action argument, King contended that the bank
performed a "public function" by seizing the automobile. 44 He maintained that the resolution of competing proprietary claims and the
enforcement of those decisions by a seizure of property are uniquely
functions of the state. Therefore, King argued that when the bank
repossessed his automobile pursuant to section 9-503, it did so as an
agent of the state. 4 5 The court dismissed this argument by noting that
"the state was not even an apparent participant" in the repossession
process, and that the bank's power to exercise self-help was derived
solely from its private contractual right. 46 The court's rejection of
King's arguments is no doubt correct from the standpoint of precedent. The vast majority of state and federal courts which have con(1) Notice of Seizure of Motor Vehicle, Form CO-55 . . . is filed with
the state of New Jersey Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor Vehicles ....
(2) Notice of Sale of the vehicle is sent the debtor pursuant to N.J.S.
12A:9-504.
(3) The repossessed vehicle is advertised for sale in a local newspaper pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S. 12A:9-504.
(4) Application for Repossession Certificate of Ownership and Certificate of
Compliance per Article 9 of U.C.C. (N.J.S. 12A:9-101, et seq.) Form CO-57 ... is
filed [with the State of New Jersey Department of Public Safety, Division of
Motor Vehicles].
(5) After the sale of the repossessed vehicle the secured party sends to the
State of New Jersey . . . [a] copy of letter sent to the debtor by certified mail
indicating proof of service, proof of publication of advertisement, a copy of the
security agreement and a check for $3.00 for a new Certificate of Ownership. All
this to comply with N.J.S. 39:10-15.
Id. at 16-17.
41 Id. at 15 (quoting from Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961)). For a discussion of Burton see note 24 supra.
42 66 N.J. at 176-77, 330 A.2d at 9.
43 Id. at 176, 330 A.2d at 9.
44 Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 1, at 19-21.
4Id. at 19-20.
4 66 N.J. at 176, 330 A.2d at 9.

1975]

NOTES

sidered the question have refused to find state action in self-help
repossession. 47
Justice Pashman, nevertheless, dissented from the majority's
state action decision. He maintained that the question of state action
' 48
was largely a factual one depending in part upon "local conditions. "
Contending that the majority had "somewhat overstate[d] the historical pedigree of self-help repossession," 49 he argued that the state,
through codification, had placed its imprimatur on what previously
had been an uncertain remedy.5 0 This, coupled with the extensive
scheme of state regulation, was deemed sufficient, by Justice Pashman, to support a finding of state action. 51 Thus determining that
state action existed, Justice Pashman would be guided by the analysis
formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Fuentes v.
Shevin. 5 2 In that case, the Court found that even a temporary deprivation by the state of the debtor's possessory interest in property was
protected by the fourteenth amendment. 53 As Justice Pashman stated:
The principles set out in Fuentes would clearly require prior
notice and hearing on the facts of the present case. The interests of
the parties [in King] are indistinguishable .... 54

Though the interests of the parties in King may be similar to
those in Fuentes, the action of the state was not. In Fuentes, the state
47

1d. at 181 & n.1, 330 A.2d at 11. At least seven circuit courts have considered
challenges to the constitutionality of self-help and have dismissed the cases for failure to
state a cause of action, holding that no state action exists in self-help. The United States
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in six of these cases. See Brantley v. Union Bank &
Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365, 366 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Gibbs v.
Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1114, 1115 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974);
Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'! Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 929 (ist Cii.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16, 17 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324, 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank,
493 F.2d 739, 745 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974). There is no indication that
certiorari was applied for in Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974).
For state court decisions in this area see, e.g., Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va.
1974); John Deere Co. v. Catalano, 525 P.2d 1153 (Colo. 1974).
4 66 N.J. at 189, 330 A.2d at 15-16. Justice Pashman, recognizing that self-help
repossession is generally confined to automobiles, directed his dissent particularly to this
fact, stating that "[e]ven temporary deprivation of the use of a car may have serious
consequences" to individuals using their automobiles for commuting to work or necessary shopping. Id. at 185, 330 A.2d at 14.
4 Id. at 190 n.6, 330 A.2d at 16.
50 Id. at 190-91 n.6, 330 A.2d at 16-17.
51 See id. at 181-83, 190, 330 A.2d at 12-13, 16-17.
52 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

53 Id. at 84-85.
54 66 N.J. at 187, 330 A.2d at 14.
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officers and agents were directly involved in effectuating the
creditor's summary remedy. 55 No such direct state involvement was
present in King. Furthermore, as Justice Pashinan concedes, the
"well-nigh overwhelming weight of authority on this much litigated
question" has failed to find that codification or regulation of self-help
amounts to state action. 56 Finally, a recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court, handed down after King, supports the
majority's resolution of the state action issue.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,57 the plaintiff contended
that a privately owned utility's termination of her electrical service,
without notice or opportunity for a hearing, constituted state action in
58
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court considered a number of state action theories in testing
whether the state was significantly involved in the termination process. Among these were "authorization," "regulation," and "public
5
function. "

9

Paralleling King's codification arguments, the plaintiff in Jackson
claimed that since the defendant utility had reserved the right to
summarily terminate service in a general tariff provision on file with
the Public Utilities Commission, and since that state agency had
failed to prohibit or object to the provision, it had authorized and encouraged the summary termination practice. 60 The Court determined

that the PUC's failure to object to the contested provision at most
only authorized the utility to elect to terminate service at its discretion. 6 1 It drew a distinction between a neutral authorization by the
5 In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), creditors, pursuant to state law, could
obtain prejudgment writs of replevin on ex parte application to an officer of the court.
Id. at 70-72. A sheriffwould then execute the writ by seizing the property in dispute. Id.

at 75, 77.
m 66 N.J. at 180-81, 330 A.2d at 11 (footnote omitted).
57 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
5 Id. at 346-48. Although Jackson is not a self-help repossession case, the issues resolved by the Court's analysis parallel the state action issue generally raised by debtors
in self-help cases-that is, at what point is the state sufficiently involved in an ostensibly private act so as to attribute that act to the state. At least one federal court has noted
that the utility summary termination cases are meaningful in analyzing state action
challenges to self-help based on the argument of comprehensive state regulation. Adams

v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 334-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1006 (1974).
59 419 U.S. at 350-54. For a detailed analysis of these and other state action theories
see generally Burke & Reber, supra note 26, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. at 1050-74, 1091-1109;

Note, State Action: Theoriesfor Applying ConstitutionalRestrictions to Private Activity,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 665-66, 685-98 (1974).
60 419 U.S. at 354-57.
61 Id. at 357.

NOTES

1975]

state, whereby a private party is permitted to act, and an imperative authorization, where the state commands or orders a private act. 62 The

former, where the impetus comes from the private party exercising a
choice permitted by state law, was deemed not to be state action. 63
Turning to the regulation issue, the Court noted that a private
utility is more heavily regulated than other private entities. That factor, without more, was not considered sufficient to support a claim of
64
state action:
[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus

between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity
so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.65

The Jackson Court also refused to find that the utility, by providing an "essential public service," was exercising a public function.
The Court indicated that the "public function" cases were to be narrowly interpreted, and only applied to those situations where a private entity engages in an activity "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State."-66 Thus, the Court concluded that the state was not
sufficiently involved in the termination process to warrant a finding of
state action. 6 7 The Jackson decision, coupled with the prevailing view
of the lower federal courts, would seem to preclude a finding of state
involvement in self-help sufficient to invoke the protections of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the authority of the federal courts under the fourteenth
amendment is circumscribed by the requirement of state action and
A2 Id.
63

Id.

64 Id. at 350-51.

65 Id. at 351 (emphasis added). The Court's refusal to find state action in such a comprehensively regulated industry as a utility strongly suggests that future challenges to
self-help based on the regulation theory will be unsuccessful.
76 Id. at 352-53. The petitioner in Jackson faced the same state action obstacle that
debtors encounter when challenging self-help on federal grounds-an inability to get to
the merits of the case. The Jackson Court restricted its analysis to whether state action
existed, and specifically stated that it did not reach either of the other issues raised by
petitioner, namely, whether her entitlement to electrical service under state law was a
property interest deserving of due process protection, or, if there were state action, what
process would be due. Id. at 348 n.2, 359.
While Jackson is offered here primarily for the Court's state action analysis, summary
termination by the utility company may be viewed as a form of self-help repossession if
the right to reasonably continuous utility service is judged a property interest. Although
the Court declined to reach that issue, it indicated that even if the interest in continuing
utility service were a property interest, the private nature of termination would still place
that act beyond the purview of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 348 n.2.
67 Id. at 358-59.
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limited by the doctrine of federalism, 68 state courts are not so
restricted. 69 The task of safeguarding the rights of individuals in their
70
everyday relationships and conduct rests primarily with the states.
Therefore, it is in the state courts that debtors may find a more appropriate and receptive forum for their challenges to self-help. Recognizing this fundamental distinction, Justice Pashman continued his
dissent, urging the state court to exercise its "power to advance or
retard the development of a consumer market place based on principles of good faith and fair dealing." 7 1 To advance these ideals, he
would find self-help invalid under the state constitution 72 and on
73
grounds of unconscionability.
Examining the New Jersey constitution, Justice Pashman contended that the debtor's possessory interest in property subject to
self-help repossession was entitled to protection under article 1,
paragraph 1 of that document, 74 which "has consistently been construed to protect citizens against deprivation of property without due
process.' ' 15 Further, he argued that paragraph 1 could be read to protect citizens not only from state interference, but also from "purely
68 The Supreme Court has stated that the principles of federalism operate as a necessary restraint upon federal courts in a system which is sensitive "to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971).
69 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 490, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), where the court stated that in an equal protection analysis
under the state constitution
there is absent the principle of federalism which cautions against too expansive a
view of a federal constitutional limitation upon the power and opportunity of the
several States to cope with their own problems in the light of their own circumstances.
70See Burke & Reber, supra note 26, 46 S.CAL. L. REV. at 1015-16, for a discussion
of the limitations of the fourteenth amendment and the role of the states in regulating the
private affairs of individuals. See also Note, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. Civ. RICHTs-CIV. LiB. L. REv. 271, 274-75 (1973), wherein the suggestion is made that since "the Supreme Court has assumed a less activist posture" with
respect to federal-state relations, an increased responsibility falls upon the states to
safeguard individual rights and liberties.
71 66 N.J. at 181, 330 A.2d at 11.
72 Id. at 194, 330 A.2d at 19.
73 Id. at 198-99, 330 A.2d at 21.
74 N.J. CONST. art. 1,

1 provides:

All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness.
(Emphasis added.)
7566 N.J. at 91, 330 A.2d at 17.
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private interference with property rights." 7 6 He found it unnecessary
to determine whether the state constitution required "merely a relaxed state action requirement or no requirement at all of state
action," 77 since under either construction the debtor was entitled to
due process before he could be deprived of his possessory interest in
78
the automobile.
After removing the obstacle of state action and determining that
King was entitled to due process protection, Justice Pashman again
looked to the Fuentes line of cases for guidance. 79 Recognizing that
those decisions are not binding on state courts construing their own
constitutions, 8 0 Justice Pashman nevertheless argued that they con7 Id. at 194, 330 A.2d at 18. Both the majority and dissent acknowledged that New
Jersey courts have previously found that article 1 protects the rights of individuals from
private as well as state encroachment. See id. at 177, 194, 330 A.2d at 9-10, 18. For example, in Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 175 A.2d 639 (1961) the plaintiffs, employees of defendants, alleged they were wrongfully discharged by defendants
because of their membership in a union. Charges were filed with the National Labor Relations Board, which rejected jurisdiction, maintaining defendants were insufficiently
involved with interstate commerce. Id. at 191-92, 175 A.2d at 640-41. Plaintiffs then
brought suit in superior court contending that their right to organize and bargain collectively, protected by article 1, paragraph 19, of the New Jersey constitution, had been
violated. The chancery court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 191-93, 175 A.2d
at 640-41. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the defendants' contentions that the constitutional provisions safeguarded these guaranteed rights only from
legislative or judicial encroachment and responded:
We agree that the Legislature or the judiciary cannot abridge these rights, but
the constitutional provision reaches beyond governmental action. It also protects employees against the acts of individuals who would abridge these rights.
Id. at 196, 175 A.2d at 643 (emphasis added). Thus, the court held that private infringement of individual rights guaranteed by the state constitution stated a cause of action. See
also Note, supra note 70,at 33 8-39, which offers an excellent profile of the role of the
New Jersey courts under the state's bill of rights and which suggests that there is no
requirement of state action under article 1 of the New Jersey constitution.
7766 N.J. at 194, 330 A.2d at 19.
78 Id.

79Id. at 195, 330 A.2d at 19. Although those cases dealt with the question of what
procedural safeguards must be afforded a debtor before his property could be seized by
state agents or officers, the court's analysis becomes significant in light of Justice
Pashman's contention that, under the New Jersey constitution, due process attaches to
self-help repossession even when the state is not an active participant. The major cases in
which the United States Supreme Court has considered the procedural due process question as applied to creditor's remedies are: North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (ex parte issuance of writ of garnishment) (decided subsequent
to King); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (issue of writ of sequestration
on ex parte application to judge); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (issue of prejudgment writ of replevin on ex parte application to a court clerk); Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment by ex parte application to clerk of the
court).
80 In reference to Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), Justice Pashman
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tain persuasive authority as to the form of due process required in
self-help repossession. Therefore, he would adopt the posture of the
81
Fuentes Court.
In Fuentes, the Court determined that notwithstanding the fact
that the debtor lacked "full legal title to the ... goods," he was
entitled to notice and a pre-seizure hearing before he could be deprived of his possessory interest. 82 Following this rationale, Justice
Pashman looked to the competing interests of the parties to determine what procedures should control the repossession process. 83 He
determined that the creditor was interested primarily in protecting
84
his security and thereby guaranteeing the repayment of his loan.
The debtor's interest was that of continued use and possession of
"what may well be an essential piece of personal property." 8 5 In his
view, the balance weighed heavily on the side of the debtor. 86 The
proper constitutional accommodation of these interests would therefore be to temporarily safeguard the debtor's possessory interest-"a
88
87
significant property interest" -unless extraordinary circumstances
dictated otherwise:
The debtor is entitled to remain undisturbed in his possession un-

less the creditor notifies him prior to seizing the goods and demonnoted "that in construing the Constitution of 1947 we are not bound to adopt retrogressive decisions of the United States Supreme Court." 66 N.J. at 195-96 n.7, 330 A.2d at 19.
See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 490, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973), where the court stated:
The question whether the equal protection demand of our State Constitution
is offended remains for us to decide. Conceivably a State Constitution could be
more demanding.
'" 66 N.J. at 195-96 & n.7, 330 A.2d at 19.
82 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-86 (1972).
83 Justice Pashman reviewed the policy considerations advanced by creditors and
courts as support for their contentions that due process standards should not apply in
self-help. These considerations include "the administrative convenience of creditors, the
possible burden on the courts, and the effects . . . on the cost and availability of consumer
credit." 66 N.J. at 197, 330 A.2d at 21. He observed that administrative convenience
should not be sought at the expense of citizen's rights; nor should the possibility of an
increased work load discourage courts from providing relief. Id. at 197-98, 330 A.2d at
20-21. Finally, Justice Pashman rejected the claims that application of due process to
self-help would result in an increase in the cost and a reduction in the availability of
credit. He viewed these claims as speculative, and irrelevant to an analysis of constitutional rights. Id. at 198, 330 A.2d at 21.
84 Id. at 195, 330 A.2d at 19.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 407 U.S. at 87.

s 66 N.J. at 195, 330 A.2d at 19. This is in accord with Fuentes, wherein the Court
conceded that "[t]here are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and
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strates at a suitable preseizure hearing that he is likely to be able to
prove that he is entitled to immediate possession. 8 9

Although the King majority acknowledged that the provisions of
the New Jersey constitution enabled the court to look beyond traditional concepts of state action, it refused to find that self-help
abridged any fundamental rights. 9 0 The court's reasoning was based
on the principles of Mitchell v. W. T. Grant,9 ' which, it contended,
had "severely limited, if not overruled" Fuentes.9 2 At issue in Mitchell
was whether a sheriff's seizure of certain household goods pursuant to
a writ of sequestration issued under Louisiana law violated due
process. 93 The Mitchell Court found a duality of interest in the seized
property. The interest of the creditor, created by a state vendor's lien
and "measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase price," was
balanced against the possessory interest of the debtor. 94 Concluding
that the sequestration process, which provided for sworn affidavits to
support the ex parte writ and a prompt post-seizure hearing, effected
a "constitutional accommodation of" both these interests, the Court
95
found the "procedure as a whole" compatible with due process.
Applying this rationale, the King majority reasoned that the same
96
duality of interests existed in the repossessed automobile at issue.
Since the court determined that this duality had been created by bargaining and contracting in a manner "inoffensive to law, morals, honesty or public policy," it found that no issue of fundamental rights was
involved. 9 7 Since neither party's interest rose to constitutional dimensions, both were measured by the terms of the private contract. 98
The court concluded that if it interfered with the agreement between
the parties, it-wo-ld "itself, encroach upon [a] fundamental right by
withdrawing from the parties their traditional freedom to contract." 99
The King court's heavy reliance on the right to contract may distort
the true interests of the parties. Freedom to contract is not an absoopportunity for a hearing ....

These situations, however, must be truly unusual." 407 U.S.

at 90 (footnote & citation omitted).
89 66 N.J. at 195, 330 A.2d at 19.
90Id. at 177-78, 330 A.2d at 9-10.
91 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
92 66 N.J. at 165 n.2, 330 A.2d at 3.

93 416 U.S. at 602-03.
94 Id. at 604.
95 Id. at 610.

66 N.J. at 178, 330 A.2d at 10.
Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 179, 330 A.2d at 10.
96
97
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lute right; and, when contract terms are unduly restrictive of either
party's fundamental rights, courts have not hesitated to reject the offending provisions.' 0 0
Reliance on Mitchell is also questionable. Central to the Mitchell
Court's decision was a determination that the Louisiana sequestration
procedure contained sufficient safeguards to protect the debtor
against abuses of the ex parte seizure.101 These procedural protections
are absent in self-help repossession. 10 2 Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc. ,103 rendered subsequent to King, appears on the surface to have reaffirmed Fuentes,10 4 or, at least, to have reiterated the
Court's policy of expanding the "concepts of procedural due process"
05
in the creditor remedy area. 1
100 See, e.g., Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N.J. Eq. 223, 245, 159 A. 661, 670 (Ch. 1932),
where the court, in reference to the rights enumerated in article 1, paragraph 1 of the
1844 New Jersey constitution (the same rights as found in the 1947 constitution) stated:
Those unalienable rights being guaranteed by the constitution, any contract,
unreasonably restrictive thereof, is necessarily void. I do not suggest that every
contract restrictive of constitutional rights is void. Mutual advantages arising
from such contracts equal to the burdens assumed or privileges curtailed may
justify an individual in waiving constitutional rights. But those rights which the
constitution recognizes as unalienable will be preserved by the courts notwithstanding individual contracts of waiver especially where the public interest is
affected because that interest transcends the will or whim of the individual.
Accord, Collins v. International Alliance of Stage Employees, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 241, 182
A. 37, 43 (Ch. 1935).
101 416 U.S. at 605-07.
102 See, e.g., 66 N.J. at 188, 330 A.2d at 15, where Justice Pashman stated that
"[p]lainly, none of the procedural factors that saved the Louisiana statute is present in
this case."
103 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
104 Id. at 605-06. Justice Stewart, concurring, remarked: "It is gratifying to note

that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin . . . seems to have been greatly exaggerated." Id. at 608 (citations omitted).
105 Id. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring). In North Georgia, the Court struck down as
unconstitutional a Georgia statute that permitted a writ of garnishment to issue upon a
plaintiff's ex parte application (a) if a suit were pending, (b) if the plaintiff, by affidavit,
stated the amount allegedly due, and (c) if the writ were not issued, he would have
" 'reason to apprehend the loss of the [amount due] or some part thereof.' " Id. at 60108. The controversy was between two corporate parties, and the writ attached to defendant's bank account. Id. at 607-08. The Supreme Court distinguished Mitchell and relied upon Fuentes, stating:
The Georgia statute is vulnerable for the same reasons [demonstrated in
Fuentes]. Here, a bank account, surely a form of property, was impounded and,
absent a bond, put totally beyond use during the pendency of the litigation on
the alleged debt, all by a writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk without
notice or opportunity for an early hearing and without participation by a judicial
officer.
Id. at 606.
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In addition to his contention that self-help repossession violates
both federal and state due process, Justice Pashman would find the
contractual provisions for self-help, contained in the standard form
installment sales agreement, unconscionable.10 6 Admitting that his
position was "novel," and that the standards for finding unconscionability are somewhat vague, he viewed the issue as largely a factual
07
one to be assayed "in light of its own peculiar commercial context."1
He noted that the offending provision was part of a form contract
entered into by parties of unequal bargaining power, the effect of
which was "to put the consumer wholly at the mercy of the secured
creditor [who] may seize the goods based upon a secret and unexpressed allegation of default."' 10 8 Determining that this self-help provision would not have been accepted by a reasonable consumer with
an opportunity to bargain on equal terms, Justice Pashman would
hold these terms of the contract unconscionable. 0 9
To arrive at this conclusion, Justice Pashman was constrained to
consider the fact that although the codification of self-help had been
deemed, by the majority, insufficient to support a finding of state
action, section 9-503 was, nonetheless, an expression of legislative
The Court determined that the procedural safeguards that had saved the sequestration procedure in Mitchell were absent in the present case. Id. at 606-07.
Another distinguishing factor, unarticulated by the Court, was that in Mitchell, the
Court determined that there was a duality of property interest created by the vendorvendee relationship since the creditor had a prior interest in the seized property. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974). This duality was absent in North
Georgia.
106 66 N.J. at 198-99, 330 A.2d at 21. Justice Pashman cited the unconscionability
provisions of Article 2 of the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code as applicable to
"[secured] transactions under Article 9 which are incidental to sales." Id. at 199 n.9, 330
A.2d at 21. Cf. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 124-25, 232 A.2d 405, 418 (1967).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-302(1) (1962) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
107 66 N.J. at 199, 202, 330 A.2d at 21, 23.
108 Id. at 200, 330 A.2d at 22.
109 Id. at 200-01, 330 A.2d at 22. It is well established that New Jersey courts can
invalidate contracts which they find to be unconscionable as contrary to public policy.
For example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 408, 161 A.2d 69, 97
(1960), the New Jersey supreme court declared a disclaimer of implied warranties in a
consumer contract void as against public policy. See also Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232
A.2d 405 (1967), in which the court stated that consumers must be protected against
unconscionable clauses and it is "the policy of our state . . . to protect conditional
vendees against imposition by conditional vendors and installment sellers." Id. at 124,
232 A.2d at 418.
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-and therefore public-policy.1 1 0 He attempted to overcome this
obstacle by suggesting that the intent of the legislature was not fairly
expressed in Article 9, and particularly section 9-503. To demonstrate, Justice Pashman examined the history and purpose of Article 9,
determining that when the drafters of the UCC decided "not to deal
with the concededly special problems of consumers but to write a
single unified law applicable to all commercial transactions,"' 11 1 they
intended that the states adopting Article 9 would also enact legislation
dealing with consumer transactions on a local level."l l Noting this, he
argued that Article 9 was not drafted to specifically apply to the area
of consumer installment sales, and therefore concluded that the
legislature's action need be given only slight weight in testing for
unconscionability. 113
This analysis seems to impute the intent of the drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code to that of the New Jersey legislature. The
legislature is deemed to be aware of its own enactments, 1 14 and Justice Pashman fails to point to any supplementing legislation that
110 66 N.J. at 201, 330 A.2d at 22. See Singer Co. v. Gardner, 65 N.J. 403, 323 A.2d 457
(1974). In Singer, the lower court had held what it considered "a cross-collateral security
agreement" unconscionable. Id. at 412-13, 323 A.2d at 463. The supreme court reversed,
holding that cross-collateral security agreements were not per se unconscionable, and
admonishing the trial court for its willingness to declare unconscionable a financing
agreement "specifically sanctioned" by the legislature through the adoption of the UCC
which provides for such arrangements. The court argued that "at the very least this
statutory section should have been weighted in any determination of unconscionability
under section 2-302." Id. at 413-14, 323 A.2d at 463-64.
11" 66 N.J. at 201, 330 A.2d at 22.
112 Id. The history of Article 9 supports Justice Pashman's contention that that Article
was not intended to be all-inclusive.
The draft of 1949 originally made a distinction between consumer and commercial
repossession and "contained provisions requiring ... notice ... before repossessing if the
collateral was a consumer good" on which "60 percent of the purchase price" was paid.
McCall, The Past as Prologue:A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 58,
77 (1973). This provision was subsequently deleted in deference to the belief that the
states could better deal with reform legislation in the consumer area. Id. at 77-78. This
decision is manifested in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment 1, which
states in part:
Consumer installment sales and consumer loans present special problems of
a nature which makes special regulation of them inappropriate in a general
commercial codification. . . . While this Article applies generally to security
interests in consumer goods, it is not designed to supersede [state] regulatory
legislation ....
'1366 N.J. at 201, 330 A.2d at 22.
114 See, e.g., State v. Federanko, 26 N.J. 119, 129, 139 A.2d 30, 36 (1958), wherein the
court stated:
The Legislature is presumed to be familiar with its own enactments, with judicial declarations relating to them, and to have passed or preserved cognate laws
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would show the legislature did not intend self-help to apply to consumer transactions." 5 The legislature still remains the final arbiter of
public policy,11 6 and, as stated by a previous court,
[t]he court cannot substitute its conception of sound public policy
legislature, if there be no disregard of a
for that entertained by the
7
constitutional mandate.1
Therefore, despite Justice Pashman's novel approach, the codification
of self-help repossession remains a formidable impediment to any
finding that the remedy is per se unconscionable.
It is now apparent that the standard challenges to self-help based
on federal constitutional grounds will not prevail because of debtors'
inability to satisfy the state action requirement. In this respect, the
King court's refusal to find state action merely confirms in New Jersey
what has previously been accepted by the vast majority of courts considering the question" 8 and is consonant with the current state action
stance of the United States Supreme Court. 1 19
The primary significance of King is found in the analysis of selfhelp remedies under the state constitution. Recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court have clearly expanded the procedural
with the intention that they be construed to serve a useful and consistent purpose.
Accord, Barringer v. Miele, 6 N.J. 139, 144, 77 A.2d 895, 897 (1951).
115 The Retail Installment Sales Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-1 to -103 was enacted
by the legislature to protect the average consumer. Steffenauer v. Mytelka & Rose, Inc.,
87 N.J. Super. 506, 513, 210 A.2d 88, 94 (Ch. 1965), aff'd, 46 N.J. 299, 216 A.2d 585
(1966). This act includes purchases under motor vehicle installnent contracts, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:16C-1, but the legislature has not included within the statute's provisions a

prohibition of self-help iepOession. it has, however, prohibitd certain clauses that may
be particularly onerous to consumers. Under this act, a retail installment sales agreement
may not contain:

1) A provision that permits the seller to accelerate the balance if he "deems himself
to be insecure." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-35.
2) A provision "whereby the retail buyer waives any right of action against the retail

seller." N.J.

STAT. ANN. §

17:16C-36.

3) A "power of attorney to confess judgment." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-37.
116 See, e.g., Weintraub,Judicial Legislation, 81 N.J.L.J. 545, 549 (1958), wherein the
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey urged the judiciary to be aware

of its law-making power, but emphasized that

[t]here of course are restraints on this judicial role. Foremost, is the duty of
the judiciary to respect the paramount authority of the legislature when the

legislature does act ....

The ultimate arbiter of public policy (apart from constitu-

tional limitations) must be the popular branch of government.
117

State ex rel. State Bd. of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 519,

179 A. 116, 124 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935).
118 66 N.J. at 181, 330 A.2d at 11 (footnote omitted).
119 See notes 57-67 supra and accompanying text.
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due process protection afforded debtors, 120 and this posture by the
Court will continue to encourage debtors to mount challenges to
self-help. The state courts may, however, prove to be more successful
forums for these challenges, particularly where the degree of state
action required to invoke the due process protections of the state
constitution is less than that required under the fourteenth
amendment. 121 Once determining that due process applies to selfhelp transactions, and that an encumbered possessory interest is a
constitutionally protected property right, state courts will be in a position to reach the merits of the self-help controversy. The appropriate
form of due process required will then depend upon whether the
state court chooses to adopt the Fuentes Court's approach, requiring
preseizure hearings in all cases, the "duality of interests" approach of
the Mitchell Court, or some intermediate standard.
Efforts in state courts to restrain abuses in self-help activity may
be impeded by judicial reluctance to remedy what is considered by
some to be a legislative responsibility. 12 2 Nevertheless, the concept of
120 See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring), where the Justice stated:
the Court in the past unanimously approved prejudgment attachment liens similar to those at issue in this case. . . . But the recent expansion of concepts of
procedural due process requires a more careful assessment of the nature of the
governmental function served by the challenged procedure and of the costs the
procedure exacts of private interests.
(Citations omitted.) See also cases cited note 79 supra.
121 The California supreme court has noted that
California courts have long preserved the individual's right to notice and a meaningful hearing in instances in which a significant deprivation is threatened by a
private entity, as well as by a governmental body.
Randone v. Appellate Dept., Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 550 n.ll, 488 P.2d 13, 22, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 718 (1971) (emphasis in original). Other states do not have the word "state"
included within their due process clause. For example, the New York constitution provides in part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
Whether a particular state's constitution includes the same state action requirement
as that of the fourteenth amendment, a lesser requirement, or no requirement of state
action at all must be determined on a case-by-case basis, since
it is often hard to say whether a state constitution has a state action requirement
because in many states the point has not been litigated and the constitutional
language is ambiguous. It is, moreover, somewhat misleading to speak of a state
constitution as either having or not having a state action requirement because it
may have such a requirement for some provisions and not for others.
Note, supra note 70, at 297 n.143.
122 This reluctance is evidenced in the King opinion where the majority asserted its
refusal to " 'sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of
laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.' " 66 N.J. at
179, 330 A.2d at 11 (quoting from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
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private, unsupervised seizures must be more fully examined by both
bodies in the light of today's consumer marketplace, and must not be
23
judged by what has been permitted in the past. 1
Edward J. Frisch
123 The National Commission on Consumer Finance has prepared a detailed study of
creditors' rights and has recommended to Congress that
[w]ith full understanding of its probable impact, . . . that prior to
repossession-whether with or without judicial process-the debtor must be
given notice of the claim against him and the opportunity to be heard on the
merits of the underlying claim.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON

CONSUMER FINANCE,

REPORT ON CONSUMER

CREDIT IN THE

UNITED STATES 30 (1972). The Commission further stated "this recommendation is based

on the concept that an individual has the right to continued 'use and possession of
property (free) from arbitrary encroachment.' " Id.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)).

(footnote omitted) (quoting from

